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REAL EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL LAW
ALBERT BRENMAN AND ROBERT ROSNIK*

Demonstrative or real evidence is evidence addressed directly
to the senses without the intervention of witnesses, as by actual
sight, hearing, or taste. In criminal law such evidence is inadmissible if it explains no fact and is not relevant to any disputed
issue. Models, casts, and other reproductions of relevant objects
may be used to illustrate oral testimony.1 In this article an attempt
will be made to point out various types of real evidence that the
Colorado Supreme Court has held admissible.
REAL EVIDENCE WHICH FORMS PART OF THE TRANSACTION

Articles which form a part of the transaction or which serve
to unfold or explain it may be accepted in evidence if they are
properly identified and are in substantially the same condition as
at the time of the offense.
In Cliff v. People 2 where the defendant, a bank president,
was being prosecuted for embezzlement, certain bank books and
memoranda were admitted over the defendant's objection that
they were not in defendant's handwriting and were not shown to
have been made under defendant's direction or with his knowledge. The supreme court held that such direction and knowledge
need not be proved by direct evidence, circumstantial evidence
being sufficient. Here the bank was small, the president was in
direct control and there was an unavoidable inference that all
book entries and memos were made with defendant's knowledge
and direction.
In Trujillo v. People,3 the defendant was charged with failure
to provide support for an illegitimate child of the complaining
witness. The court was confronted with the admissibility of a
hotel register which the defendant acknowledged signing on three
separate occasions, claiming that on those occasions he was at
the hotel with a woman other than the complainant. The register
was admitted in evidence after being identified by the husband
of the owner of the hotel even though such witness had not seen
the defendant sign it. The supreme court sustained the trial
court's ruling admitting the register in evidence, for not only
did the complainant identify defendant's signature, but on crossexamination the defendant admitted signing the book. The register merely corroborated the testimony of the parties.
PROPERTY OF THE ACCUSED

Property of the accused which is sufficiently identified and
shown to belong to the accused or to have come from his possession, and which throws light upon the crime or serves to connect
the accused with it, is admissible. The accused may be permitted
to introduce property belonging to him to impeach the prosecu* Students, University of Denver College of law.
122 C.J.S. 1201 § 708.
84 Colo. 254, 269 P. 907 (1928).
'122 Colo. 436, 222 P. 2d 775 (1950).
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tion's witness. In Wolf v. People 4 where the defendant was
charged with burglary with force, burglary without force, and
receiving stolen goods, evidence consisting of articles identified
as stolen from the premises were held admissible by the Colorado
court. These articles were recovered by police either in the apartment occupied by defendant and his wife, in the shop of defendant, or otherwise definitely proven to have been in his possession
shortly after the buglary in question.
The defendants in Rude v. United States 5 were charged with
false advertising through the mails with intent to defraud. The
court allowed in evidence a suit purchased by a post office inspector which was advertised as an unclaimed $5 suit but which turned
out to be a regular stock suit.
In a suit for divorce on the grounds that the wife shot at
her husband, there was admitted into evidence a pistol, alleged
to have been used by the wife, and a coat worn by the plaintiff
through which the bullet was alleged to have passed. 6 It was said
to be within the discretion of the trial court to allow the jury to
have the pistol and coat in the jury room during their deliberations. The supreme court said that the trial court's discretion
will not be interfered with in the absence of manifest abuse. The
court further stated that it was proper that the objects to which
testimony relates should be brought into court and exhibited,
when this can be done. This was said to be more satisfactory than
descripti,
of such evidence by witnesses who have inspected
it outside of court.
In a case in which the defendants were charged with conspiracy to commit arson and consipracy to burn a house to defraud
the insurers, a valise and a bundle of letters addressed to the husband of the owner of the house were admitted in evidence to
show knowledge and preparation for the crime. The sole purpose
of admitting this evidence was to show that the owner of the
house, a defendant, was expecting the house to barn, and therefore, articles
such as these would naturally have been removed
7
by him.
PROPERTY OF THE VICTIM

Property of the injured or killed party found at the scene
of the crime or accident, in or about the defendant's possession,
or elsewhere, is admissible in evidence. For example, in a prosecution for homicide, the deceased's bloodstained clothing was admitted over the defendant's objection the defendant stating that
the exhibition was unnecessary and was calculated to, and did,
arouse the passions of the jurors and sway their judgment. The
court held, on appeal, that if evidence is competent, relevant, and
material as this evidence was, it should not be rejected because
it brings vividly to the jury the details of a shocking crime. This,
1123 Colo. 487, 230 P. 2d 581 (1951).
574 Fed. 2d 673 (1935).
'Fowler v. Fower, 63 Colo. 451, 168 P. 648 (1917).
I Mukuri v. People, 92 Colo. 306, 19 P. 2d 1040 (1933).
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the court said is the lawful purpose of evidence. Such holding is
in accord with the general rule that although the introduction of
real evidence may incite the jury, it may be admitted
as long
8
as it illustrates and makes clear the issue of the case.
In an early federal case 9 where the problem of admitting
demonstrative evidence arose, the court held that clothing worn
by deceased at the time of the accident is admissible for the purpose of identifying the deceased and establishing the nature and
extent of the injuries. A later case, 10 held that there was no error
in admitting in evidence burned shoes worn by decedent when
death occurred from contact with a high tension wire. The shoes
were admitted to support the plaintiff's theory that the decedent
slipped on the roof of a house and came in contact with the wirea.
This evidence tended to show how the accident came about because
of marks of paint and striations on the shoes. The court stated
that the plaintiff had a right to prove his theory, and such evidence ought not to be rejected unless it clearly has no tendency
to prove or disprove relevant facts.
INSTRUMENTS OF THE CRIME

Weapons, instruments, and articles identified as the means
by which a crime was committed are admissible, provided they
are substantially in the same condition as at the time of the offense.
In Brown v. People 11 the defendant was charged with statutory
rape. The evidence introduced was a prophylactic wrapper which
the sheriff had found the next morning when he searched the
automobile in which the alleged offense was committed. This substantiated the victim's statement that the defendant made use
of a contraceptive. Likewise, in a case where the defendant was
charged with burglary and the possession of burglary tools, a
tire iron and other tools, which were not intrinsically burglary
tools, were properly admitted to show possession of burglary tools,
a separate crime, after the jury had found the defendant guilty
of the crime of burglary. The only objection of the defendant was
that he should not have been convicted of the burglary because
of lack
of sufficient identification, which issue was resolved against
2
him.'
In an abortion case 13 where the defendant was found and arrested while attending the prosecuting witness, it was held proper
to admit in evidence the tools used in the abortion, which consisted of a bottle containing white pills and other pills in yellow
cellophane both trade-marked "HR", a dark fluid in a bottle, a
metal piece with a rubber hose attached thereto, a grease gun,
and a speculum.
'Maoya v.°People, 8.8 Colo. 139, 293 P. 335 (1930).
'Baggs v. Martin, 108 Fed. 33, 44 C.C.A. 175 (1901).
1"Southern Colo. Power Co. v. Pestano, 80 Colo. 375, 251 P. 224 (1926).
11120 Colo. 493, 210 P. 2d 837 (1949).
12Smalley v. People, 116 Colo. 598, 183 P. 2d 558 (1947).
"Montgomery v. People, 117 Colo. 118, 184 P. 2d 480 (1947).
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CLOTHING OF THE ACCUSED

Articles of clothing belonging to or connected with the accused
and sufficiently identified and connected with the crime are admissible when they tend to throw light on a material inquiry and
are in substantially the some condition as at the time of the offense.
Thus in Burnham v. People 14 where the defendant was convicted
of receiving -iolen goods, the court said that clothing other than
that found in defendant's possession but part of the stock of
merchandise stolen from the same store in the same transaction
was admissible to show that the clothing he did have in his possession had been stolen. This is illustrative of an exception to
the rule that evidence of other crimes is not admissible against
the defenda~t. Evidence of thefts of other goods from the same
owner by the same thief is admissible where it is connected with
the same transaction.
LIQUOR
Liquors and related articles identified as having been in the
possession of the accused or otherwise connected with him are
admissible, provided there has been no substantial change in their
condition. In Enyart v. People,'1 the Colorado court held that
where defendant was charged with violation of the Prohibition
Act it was proper for the jury to look at and smell of the liquor
alleged to be intoxicating for the purpose of determining its character.
PEOPLE As REAL EVIDENCE
In general the jury may view the injured person to see his
scars and wounds if they tend to solve or are material to a controverted issue. This admission is competent even when it shows
horrible consequences of an assault. However, a connection must
be shown with the crime committed. For the purpose of showing
the fact of a birth of a child, where such fact is material, the admission of the child is competent; but when the paternity is in
question, the authorities are divided on the child's admissibility
to show the resemblance of the child to its putative father. A
search failed to reveal a pertinent Colorado case on the subject.
DEMONSTRATIONS

Demonstrations to illustrate matters in issue may be permitted
in the court's discretion. In an automobile negligence case, Small
v. Clark, 6 toy automobiles and maps of the scene, both drawn and
built to scale, were held admissible. These were for illustrative
purposes in connection with the testimony.
PHOTOGRAPHS

Photographs, though not considered demonstrative evidence
are very closely related thereto, and for that reason are mentioned
here. In a recent Colorado case, the defendant assaulted his wife
and threw her down steep basement steps. The next morning he
14 104

Colo. 472, 93 P. 2d 899 (1939).
1"70 Colo. 362, 201 P. 564 (1921).
1683 Colo. 211, 263 P. 933 (1928).
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found her body at the bottom of the steps. He buried her in the
body of
cellar. Photographs were admitted of the decomposed
17
the victim. The court held these admissible, saying,
Photographs are the pictured expressions of data, observed by a witness. They are often more accurate than
any description by words, and give clearer comprehension of the physical facts than can be obtained from testimony of witnesses. Ordinarily, photographs are competent evidence of anything which it is competent for a
witness to described in words. Their admissibility does
not depend upon whether the objects they portray could
be described in words, but on whether it would be helpful to permit the witness to supplement his description by their use. They are not inadmissible because
they bring vividly to the jurors, the details of a shocking crime, or tend to arouse passion or prejudice. It
is only when photographs do not illustrate or make
clear some issue of the case and are of such a character
as to prejudice the jury, that they are not admissible. Its
admission rests largely in the discretion of the trial judge,
and his decision will not be disturbed on review unless
an abuse of discretion is shown.
CONCLUSION
Demonstrative evidence is the most clear cut and convincing
type of evidence which may be brought before a court. A search
of the Colorado cases does not reveal an instance where the supreme court has overruled the trial court's discretion in admitting
evidence of this type. As long as the articles admitted are connected in some manner to the case, and tend to shed light on
motive, means, or manner of the act or crime, their admissibility
will be sustained, even though such admission might inflame or
enrage the jurors to prejudice.
Wigmore has aptly expressed the general consensus in regard
to this matter as follows

:18

It seems too rigorous to forbid a party to prove his
case by the clearest evidence, and a jury which through
violent prejudice would not be restrained by the court's
instructions would probably give way to its prejudice
even without this evidence. The courts impose no prohibition except so far as the discretion of the trial courts
may prevent abuses.
VPotts v. People, 114 Colo. 253, 158 P. 2d 739 (1945). See also Carson v.
People, 93 Colo. 478, 26 P. 2d 1068 (1933); Rowan v. People, 93 Colo. 473, 26
P. 2d 1066 (1933); Mow v. People, 31 Colo. 351, 72 P. 1069 (1903); Moya v.
People, 88 Colo. 139, 293 P. 335 (1930); King v. People, 87 Colo. 11, 285 P. 157
(1930); De Salvo v. People, 98 Colo. 368, 56 P. 2d 28 (1938) ; Millitella v. People,
95 Colo. 519, 37 P. 2d 527 (1934); Maynes v. People, 110 Colo. 149, 200 P. 2d
915 (148).
1OWigmore on Evidence, § 1158, p. 259 (3d ed.)

